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Abstract: This study attempts to analyze the market preference of coffee farmers in Vietnam. Using
the transaction cost approach, a seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) model was developed based
on the sales volume in different markets, transaction cost attributes, socioeconomic factors, and
behavioral aspects of sustainable certified coffee farmers. Factors that significantly influence farmers’
market preference include several transaction cost attributes (price uncertainty, market competition,
transportation cost, speed of payment, and sale volume agreement) and characteristics of coffee
farmers (age, ethnic, farming experience, location, and certificate ownership). Repeated economic
transaction embedded in the social relationship indicates the largest sales volume of coffee farmers to
the market of buying agents and the existence of local traders. There is a belief that formal institution
brings better market access for coffee farmers, but main issues are regarding opportunistic behavior,
imperfect market knowledge, traditional farming habits, and contract noncompliance, which have
resulted in a lower preference for the market of processors/exporters.
Keywords: market preference; transaction cost; seemingly unrelated regression
1. Introduction
Rural coffee farmers are often extremely vulnerable to climate and market shocks that leave them
struggling to improve their main source of income. Access to productive technologies and effective
production management can partly minimize the impact of climate change, yet market failure can
occur due to a variety of reasons. In this regard, improved market access has been identified as one of
the vital elements for enhancing agriculture-based economic growth and increasing rural income [1].
It is common in Vietnam that agricultural transactions are traditionally made through spot markets.
However, the problems with spot markets and the traditional price mechanism are deficiencies in
transferring production and marketing information in terms of quality, timing and future demand [2–6].
Vietnamese coffee farmers sell most of their products to purchasing agents or local traders because of
inadequate market information, limited sales channel choices, and poor marketing infrastructures.
This serves as a further reason for why smallholder farmers are often cash-strapped and forced into
a debt cycle where they seek credit to repay previous loans. Lack of bargaining power along with
various credit-bound relationships with the buyers has led them to sell off their harvest at a heavy
discount to a market rate. Smallholder farmers usually capture less than 10% of the retail price while
buyers set rules of the game, especially in the context of current oversupply of green coffee beans.
High agricultural transaction costs are major marketing constraints for smallholder farmers in
developing countries [7]. According to Sadoulet and de Janvry [8], high transportation cost issues such
as poor infrastructure and distance to market, high marketing margins due to merchants with local
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economy power, high search and recruitment costs due to imperfect information, and supervision
and incentive costs to labor create a price band that deters small farmers from entering the market.
Furthermore, household specific factors that influence participation decisions to engage in market
exchange include aversion to risk and uncertainty, social network and organization, age, gender,
education, and intra-household interactions [9]. These variables affect the transaction cost in terms of
information seeking, negotiation, monitoring, and enforcement [10]. Recent studies of the managerial
economics of agriculture have revealed that commodities with high transaction costs in marketing
and processing are ideally suited for some forms of vertical integration, such as contract farming [11].
However, while this form of institutional arrangement in developing countries has yielded successes,
it has also had many failures [4,12,13].
The purpose of this study is to examine the impacts of different transaction cost components
associated with socioeconomic characteristics of smallholder farmers on the marketing of sustainable
certified coffee in different sales channels in Dak Lak Province, Vietnam. Sale decisions have been
among the most complex and challenging decisions facing coffee farmers in Dak Lak as coffee prices can
sometimes be volatile and unpredictable. Further, the determinants of the sales channel choices among
smallholder coffee farmers have never been explored specifically in this study area. Therefore, a study
of this nature is important from a policy perspective, as it will inform practical interventions required
to improve smallholders’ market access and ultimately, secure their livelihood and participation in
the sector. In addition, many previous studies have already examined farmers’ market preference in
several agricultural sectors by using stated choice experiment and logistic regression. In this approach,
farmers are presented alternative descriptions of transaction cost attributes that influence their sale
decisions. In the real world, the research outcome might be different from their actual behavior. For
that reason, by using revealed preference and seemingly unrelated regression model (SUR), this study
hopes to provide empirical evidence to fill the gap in the existing literature.
This study used a sample of 183 farmers who have participated in the sustainable coffee program
(SCP) in Dak Lak province. Key informant interviews of different processor-exporters, purchasing
agents and local traders as well as document analysis were also used to provide the overview of
the recent market situation. The paper is organized into four sections as follows: First, the existing
literature on transaction cost economics and farmers’ behavior develops a transaction cost framework
that can be applied to the analysis of smallholder coffee farmers’ market preference. The next section
outlines the analytical approach and overview of research area and data collection. Finally, the main
findings, conclusion, and the direction of future research are discussed.
2. Review of Literature
2.1. Transaction Cost Approach
Transaction cost approach dates back to the theory of the firm created by Ronald Coase [14] who
claimed that the exchange should be organized within markets until the (transaction) cost of using the
market outweighs the cost to organize the exchange within a firm. Since then, transaction costs are
generally understood as those costs associated with the transfer, capture, and protection of ownership
rights of economic assets [2,15–24]. Throughout the seven decades of its development, there are
many definitions of transaction cost found in the literature, with different classifications and different
meanings [23,25]. Following Coase’s idea [14] with transaction cost defined as “the cost of using the
price mechanism”, Williamson [15] developed a justification and classification scheme of transaction
costs. Accordingly, transaction costs consist of the costs of finding a bargaining partner, negotiating a
sale agreement, and monitoring/enforcing performance of the terms of trade. Shelanski and Klein [26]
placed the definition of transaction costs under the complexity of the transaction, uncertainty of
future condition, and frequency of trade. Hobbs [27] categorized the components of transaction costs
in relation to the transaction with uncertainty increasing information, negotiation, and monitoring.
Delgado and Nicholson [28] classified transaction costs into observable and unobservable transaction
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costs. Key [29] defined transaction costs as fixed and proportional transaction cost. Furubotn and
Richter [30] described the transaction cost concept as the costs of defining and measuring resources or
claims, plus the costs of utilizing and enforcing the ownership right. They also classified transaction
costs in terms of the market transaction, managerial transaction, and political transaction. By far,
application of transaction costs falls under the umbrella of transaction cost economics in terms of
market exchange, governance, and measurement [24]. In addition, Den Butter and Mosch [31] defined
transaction costs in trade as they comprise transportation costs, policy barriers, information cost,
contract enforcement costs, legal and regulatory costs, local distribution costs, search costs, costs of
gathering information on product quality and the reliability of trading partners, control costs, and
costs associated with international payments. Trade pattern in the context of imperfect competition
also contributes to the differences of transaction costs [32].
With the transaction cost approach, we employed the classification scheme of transaction
cost by Hobbs [27] in our survey and analysis. Hobbs [27] also identified factors related to a
household’s socioeconomic characteristics and behavioral aspects that influence farmer’s sale decisions.
The Seemingly Unrelated Regression model for a farmer’s market preference was developed to
analyze the effect of transaction cost attributes on the market preference of sustainable coffee farmers.
The transaction cost attributes include uncertainty of price, market information, market competition,
transportation, product classification, payment, delivery frequency, contracted quantity and reliability
of trading partner. The model helps explain common issues of market and institutional failures, and
incomplete contractual arrangements in the coffee market of Vietnam.
2.2. Empirical Studies on Smallholder Farmers’ Market Preference
The agricultural sectors in developing countries experience many issues, including information
asymmetry, missing markets, risk and uncertainty, incomplete property rights, incomplete contracts,
as well as organization and institutional failures [33]. Furthermore, poor infrastructure, distance to the
market, and high marketing margin due to a power monopoly of the local traders are significant barriers
to market participation and sales channel preference by smallholder farmers [1,29,34]. A number of
empirical studies have applied the transaction cost approach to improve understanding of market
choice decisions facing farmers in developing countries.
Different authors have used binomial Logit and Probit models [35] to analyze farmers’ market
preference of different agricultural products, both of which are suitable for binary choice problems [36].
A few empirical studies employed the Tobit model. However, the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model
is most often used for the choices among three or more markets. Shema [37] employed MNL in the
study of institutional factors influencing a farmer’s choice of milk marketing channels in Rwanda.
The study showed that forms of payment negatively influenced the preference of the local vendors
marketing channel over brokers’ channel and contract farming significantly influenced the preference
of the local vendors marketing channel over the brokers’ channel. The results indicated that forms
of payment and accesses to market information negatively affect the probability of selecting the milk
collection centers marketing channel over the brokers’ channel. The MNL model was also used
by Fekadu [38] on the study of farmers’ marketing preferences in local coffee markets in Ethiopia.
Using stated choice experiment and MNL with latent class specification technique, the study showed
that characteristics of the traders are more important than the price offered when anchoring their
transactions in personal relationships.
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Considering the possible inter-relationships between various markets and a bundle of sales channel
choices made by farmers, others have employed the Multivariate Probit (MVP) econometric techniques
to simultaneously model the influence of the set of explanatory variables on each of the different sales
channel choices, while allowing the unobserved factors (error terms) to be freely correlated [7,36,39,40].
Multivariate probit regression (MVP) was used in the study of market outlet choice of a smallholder
mango producer in Southern Ethiopia. The author Honja [41] claimed that family size, distance to the
market, quantity of mango produced, and price agreement are the significant determinants for the
preference of the wholesale market. Farmers’ choice of collector market is determined by the family
size, distance to the nearest market, quantity of mango produced, price offered and access to non-farm
income. The preference of retailer market is determined by the variables such as quantity of mango
produced and price offered.
Similar to MVP, except that the dependent variables are not binary outcomes [42], the Seemingly
Unrelated Regression (SUR) model was used in the study of Bailey and Hunnicutt [43] to determine
the role of transaction costs in market selection for commercial feeder cattle operations. This approach
was also used by Krishna [44] to explain a farmer’s decision to choose the direct sales channel in retail
food systems of the United States.
Few authors have employed choice experiments as a survey-based technique for modeling the
preference of market. Data about the market selection decisions of famers can be obtained from
methods based on revealed preference or stated preference [45]. Methods based on stated preference
requires the experimental design of preference. However, Mark Wardman [46] argued that individuals’
stated preferences might not correspond closely to their actual preferences.
3. Methodology
3.1. Study Area
The study was conducted in Dak Lak province, Vietnam. Dak Lak province is located in the
Central Highlands, the upper course of Serepok River and a part of Ba River, a land famous for its coffee
and rubber production (Figure 1). Its geographic coordinates are from 107◦28′57” to 108◦59′37” east
longitude and from 12◦9′45” to 13◦25′06” north latitude with an average elevation about 400–800 m.
Dak Lak occupies an area of 13,125.37 square kilometers. Total population was 1,796,666 people and
the density was over 137 people per square kilometer. More than 75.9 percent of total population is
living in rural areas. There are 47 different ethnic minorities in Dak Lak, of which the Kinh accounts
for approximate 70 percent of total population and the rest are other ethnic minority communities
including Ede, Gia rai, M’nong, Thai, Tay, Nung, etc. The administrative units of the province are:
Buon Ma Thuot City, Town Lake and the district of Buon Ea H’Leo, Easup, Krong Nang, Krong Buk,
Buon Don, Cu M’gar, Ea Kar, M’Drac, Krong Pac, Krong Ana, Krong Bong, Lak, Cu Kuin. Dak Lak is
represented by coffee production, accounting for more than 30 percent of the total coffee production
area in Viet Nam. Coffee is also the main agricultural product and coffee export turnover in 2015 was
approximately 479 million dollars, accounted for more than 60 percent of gross domestic product by
Dak Lak province (Dak Lak People’s Committee).
Sustainability 2019, 11, 2897 5 of 20
Sustainability 2019, 11, x FOR PEER REVIEW 5 of 20 
 
Figure 1. Study area. 
3.2. Data Collection 
In this study, we collected quantitative and qualitative data from primary and secondary 
sources. The methods of data collection conducted were direct interview, key informant interview, 
and field observation in the 2017 crop year. Regarding the sampling strategy, a sample size of 200 
sustainable certified coffee farmers was purposively selected from Krong Pak (KRP) and Cu M’gar 
(CMG) districts in Dak Lak. These farmers grow certified Robusta under the sustainable coffee 
program (SCP) launched by the Dak Lak People’s Committee in 2008. Under the so-called 
industrialization process of the sector, they have recently been encouraged to coordinate with coffee 
processors/exporters (private and state-owned companies) in order to produce a greater range of 
high-quality standardized products. In the sample selection process, office experts in local 
authorities, extension centers, and the Dak Lak Department of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(DARD) were consulted. The heads of each local village are also involved in the finalizing process 
of the respondents list. The pre-test survey of 50 sustainable coffee farmers was implemented in 
April 2016. 
Questionnaire was designed into several sections. First, the respondents provide the 
information about the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the farmer household. A 
set of closed-ended questions in the latter sections was used to elicit different attributes of 
transaction costs that influence sale the decisions of the coffee farmers. Problems and concerns of a 
farmer’s participation in each market were in the final section. The response rate was 91.5 percent, 
and then final 183 questionnaires were completed. Furthermore, reports and documents regarding 
the Dak Lak coffee sector were collected from Dak Lak DARD, WASI (Western Highlands Agro-
Forestry Scientific and Technical Institute, Dak Lak, Viet Nam), Buon Ma Thuot Coffee Association 
(BMTCA), and VICOFA (Vietnam Coffee Cocoa Association). 
3.3. Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model 
In this study, the proportion of sale in different markets, transaction cost attributes, 
socioeconomic factors, and behavioral aspects of sustainable coffee farmers are analyzed using 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) developed by Zellner [47,48]. The model with p > 1 
dependent variable allows for different estimator matrices in each equation and accounts for 
contemporaneous correlation. We consider here a model comprised of M multiple regression 
equations of the form: 
Figure 1. Study area.
3.2. Data Collection
In this study, we collected quantitative and qualitative data from primary and secondary sources.
The methods of data collection conducted were direct interview, key informant interview, and field
observation in the 2017 crop year. Regarding the sampling strategy, a sample size of 200 sustainable
certified coffee farmers was purposively selected from Krong Pak (KRP) and Cu M’gar (CMG) districts
in Dak Lak. These farmers grow certified Robusta under the sustainable coffee program (SCP) launched
by the Dak Lak People’s Committee in 2008. Under the so-called industrialization process of the
sector, they have recently been encouraged to coordinate with coffee processors/exporters (private and
state-owned companies) in order to produce a greater range of high-quality standardized products.
In the sample selection process, office experts in local authorities, extension centers, and the Dak
Lak Department of Agriculture and Rural Development (DARD) were consulted. The heads of each
local village are also involved in the finalizing process of the respondents list. The pre-test survey of
50 sustainable coffee farmers was implemented in April 2016.
Questionnaire was designed into several sections. First, the respondents provide the information
about the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the farmer household. A set of
closed-ended questions in the latter sections was used to elicit different attributes of transaction
costs that influence sale the decisions of the coffee farmers. Problems and concerns of a farmer’s
participation in each market were in the final section. The response rate was 91.5 percent, and then final
183 questionnaires were completed. Furthermore, reports and documents regarding the Dak Lak coffee
sector were collected from Dak Lak DARD, WASI (Western Highlands Agro-Forestry Scientific and
Technical Institute, Dak Lak, Viet Nam), Buon Ma Thuot Coffee Association (BMTCA), and VICOFA
(Vietnam Coffee Cocoa Association).
3.3. Seemingly Unrelated Regression Model
In this study, the proportion of sale in different markets, transaction cost attributes, socioeconomic
factors, and behavioral aspects of sustainable coffee farmers are analyzed using seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) developed by Zellner [47,48]. The model with p > 1 dependent variable allows
Sustainability 2019, 11, 2897 6 of 20
for different estimator matrices in each equation and accounts for contemporaneous correlation.
We consider here a model comprised of M multiple regression equations of the form:
yti =
n∑
j=0
xti jβi j + εti, t = 1, 2, . . . , T; i = 1, 2, . . . , M; j = 1, 2, . . . , ki (1)
where yti is the tth observation on the ith dependent variable which is to be explained by the ith
regression equation, xtij is the tth observation on jth explanatory variable appearing in the ith equation,
βij is the coefficient associated with xtij at each observation and εti is the tth value of the random error
component associate with ith equation of the model.
These M equations can be compactly expressed as:
yi = Xi βi + εi, i = 1, 2, . . . , M (2)
where yi is (T × 1) vector with elements yti; Xi is (T × Ki) matrix, the columns of which represent the T
observations on an explanatory variable in the ith equation; βi is a (ki × 1) vector with elements βij; and
εi is a (T × 1) vector of disturbances. These M equations can be further expressed as:
y1
y2
...
yM
 =

X1
0
...
0
0
X2
...
0
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
0
0
...
XM


β1
β2
...
βM
+

ε1
ε2
...
εM
or y = X β + ε (3)
where the orders of y is (TM × 1), X is (TM × k *), β is (k *× 1), ε is (TM × 1) and k* = ∑ki
Treat each of the M equations as the classical regression model and make conventional assumptions
for i = 1, 2, . . . , M as:
Xi is fixed
rank (Xi) = ki → lim
T→∞
[ 1
T
X′i Xi
]
= Qii (4)
where Qii is nonsingular with fixed and finite elements:
E (ui) = 0 (5)
E (uiui
′
) = σii IT where σii is the variance of disturbances in ith equation for each observation in
the sample.
Considering the interactions between the M equations of the model, we assume:
lim
T→∞
[ 1
T
X′i X j
]
= Qi j (6)
E (uiu′j) = σi j IT; i, j = 1, 2, . . . , M (7)
where Qij is non-singular matrix with fixed and finite elements and σij is the covariance between the
disturbances of ith and jth equations for each observation in the sample.
Compactly, we can write:
E (ε) = 0 (8)
E (εε′) =

σ11IT
σ21IT
...
σM1IT
σ12IT
σ22IT
...
σM2IT
. . .
. . .
. . .
...
σ1MIT
σ2MIT
...
σMMIT
 =
∑
⊗IT = ψ (9)
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where ⊗ denotes the Kronecker product operator, ψ is (MT ×MT) matrix and Σ = ((σij)) is (M ×M)
positive definite symmetric matrix. The definiteness of Σ avoids the possibility of linear dependencies
among the contemporaneous disturbances in the M equations of the model.
The structure E (uu’) = Σ ⊗ IT implies that the:
variance of εti is constant for all t
contemporaneous covariance between εti and εtj is constant for all t
intertemporal covariance between εti and εt*j (t , t*) are zero for all i and j
3.4. Data Analysis and Model Specification
Methods of data analysis such as descriptive statistics, cross tabulation, the chi-square test and
t-test were used. Simple descriptive statistics were conducted using Statistical Package for Social
Sciences (SPSS 22.0). Another statistic program Stata 13 was used to analyze factors that influence the
farmers’ decision of the coffee market choice. Based on the theory of rational choice, coffee farmers
are expected to be rational and they are more likely to choose the mix of markets to maximize his/her
utility. As previously mentioned, if the dependent variables are categorical (proportion) outcomes
and the error terms are contemporaneously correlated, then the SUR model leads to an efficient
parameter estimate [49]. Seemingly unrelated regression models appear to be joint estimates from
several regression models, each with their own error term. The regressions are related because
the (contemporaneous) errors associated with the dependent variables may be correlated [47,48,50].
The correlations of the residuals in the PCSE, PCSA, and PCST models are−0.3031, −0.1583, and−0.5215
that we can reject the hypothesis that correlations are zero (see Table A4 Appendix A). The efficiency
gain of using the SUR method increases, not only with increasing correlation of the error terms, but also
with higher multicollinearity between explanatory variables [49]. However, a test using VIF (variance
inflation factor) indicates the absence of severe collinearity problem (see Table A3 Appendix A).
The model of market preference consists of three single equations (which share a common error
structure) to simultaneously estimate the sale proportion for each market as the following:
PCSEi = αie +
9∑
l=1
βiel TCA +
7∑
m=1
γiem DSC + εie (10)
PCSAi = αia +
9∑
l=1
βial TCA +
7∑
m=1
γiam DSC + εia (11)
PCSTi = αit +
9∑
l=1
βitl TCA +
7∑
m=1
γitm DSC + εit (12)
where αi, βi, γi, and δi are the regression coefficients to be estimated and εi are the error terms in the
SUR model for the proportion of coffee sold (PCS) of ith farmer in each market. PCSE, PCSA, and
PCST are proportion of coffee sold to market of exporter/processor, buying agent, and local trader,
respectively. TCA represents farmer’s attitudes toward different transaction cost attributes in each
market (l = UCER, INFO, COM, PORT, GRAD, PAY, FREQ, QUAN, and TRUS). DSC consists of several
demographic and socio-economic factors of coffee farmers (m = AGE, GEN, EDU, ETHN, EXPE, FARM,
and LOC), which are exactly the same regressors in each equation. Coffee farmers might select a market
either because they are satisfied with that alternative or because they are less satisfied with other
alternatives. Table 1 shows the questionnaire and specification of variables used in the SUR model.
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Table 1. Explanatory variables hypothesized to influence a farmer’s market preference.
Variable Definition Unit Questionnaire/Variable Specification Hypothesis
UCER Price uncertainty dummy
Are you certain about your coffee prices (i.e.,
price levels guarantee your satisfied profit,
reflect quality of your coffee, and represent
fair exchange, etc.) given to buyer in each
selling method? 1 = yes, 0 otherwise
+
INFO Market information dummy
Do you have sufficient market information
(i.e., coffee yield, coffee bean qualification,
harvest situation input expenses of other
farmers, local market demand and supply,
etc.) before selling your coffee to buyer in
each selling method? 1 = yes, 0 otherwise
+
COM Competitivemarket dummy
Is there more than one buyer in each selling
method that ensures competitive market?
1 = yes, 0 otherwise
+
PORT Transport dummy
Do you have to ship your coffee to buyer
location in each selling method? 1 = yes, 0
otherwise
−
GRAD Grading dummy Does buyer require coffee classification ineach selling method? 1 = yes, 0 otherwise +/−
PAY Payment dummy
Does buyer in each selling method make
payment within a week after delivery or
longer? 1 = within a week, 0 otherwise
+
DELI Delivery frequency dummy
Does buyer in each selling method schedule
the delivery before harvest? 1 = yes, 0
otherwise
+
QUAN Quantity dummy
Is the sale volume agreed and fixed before
harvest with buyer in each selling method?
1 = yes, 0 otherwise
+
TRUS Trust dummy
Do you think that your transaction with
buyer in each selling method is carried out
honestly, accurately and fairly? 1 = yes, 0
otherwise
+
AGE Age years Age of respondent +/−
GEN Gender dummy 1 = male, 0 = female +/−
EDU Education years Number of years in school +
ETHN Ethnic dummy 1 if respondent is Kinh, 0 other ethnicminorities +/−
EXPE Farmingexperience years Number of years in coffee farming +
FARM Farm size ha Number of hectares for coffee production +/−
LOC Location dummy 1 if respondent bases in Cu M’gar (CMG), 0 ifrespondent bases in Krong Pak (KRP) +/−
4. Results
4.1. The Coffee Market in Dak Lak
According to Dak Lak DARD in 2015, there are approximately 300,000 family labors, and 100,000
hired labors harvesting coffee from 203,746 hectares in Dak Lak. Coffee farmers achieved the average
productivity of 2.3 tons/hectare, which contributed to the provincial annual yield of 400,000 tons.
Smallholder coffee farmers sell their coffee to local traders, processors/exporters, roasters, and mostly
to buying agents with the sale proportion of 5.37%, 2.01%, 0.46%, and 92.16%, respectively (Dak Lak
DARD). Figure 2 presents the supply chain of coffee in Dak Lak.
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The harvest season of coffee in Dak Lak always lasts approximately a month, starting at the end
of November or beginning of December. Once the coffee cherry was picked, it is either stored for a few
weeks or hulled right away to remove the outer skin and the inner parchment. Then the preliminary dry
processing must begin as quickly as possible to prevent spoilage. These activities have been done on
the farm where many concrete yards and village roads are used for coffee sun-drying. After this, most
of the sun-dried coffee beans are delivered to buying agents (or collectors). The buying agents purchase
dried beans from smallholder farmers through individual informal contract (verbal). State-owned
companies licensed these buying agents during the 1990s (functioning as satellite agents) but they are
now operating mostly as private firms. Coffee farmers consign (or deposit) a large proportion of their
harvest to them because of their credit-bound relationship. Coffee export prices and market trends
were communicated daily between coffee farmers and buying agents. When the coffee farmers feel the
price is right, then the decided sale volume is subtracted from the farmer’s consignment. Conversely,
processors/exporters in the provincial coffee market also rely on buying agents to guarantee their
supplies of dried coffee beans. Even though these companies have been trying to integrate coffee
farmers into their own supply system through contract farming, the reward is considered insignificant.
This explains the fact that only a small proportion of farmers’ dried beans bypasses the buying agents
and are sold directly to processors/exporters.
Both private (including foreign-invested companies) processors/exporters and state-owned
processors/exporters (including joint stock companies) are in the provincial supply chain making the
coffee bean markets highly competitive. By far, the monopsony of the buying agents plus farmers’
coffee consignment to the buying agents altogether symbolizes the coffee market supply of Dak Lak [51].
Throughout significant structural change in the coffee sector, from direct government intervention
to primarily operating through private channels, the role of buying agents in the coffee market is
unquestionable. Despite fierce competition between state-owned processors/exporters (joint-stock
company) and private processors/exporters (companies with foreign direct investment) in local coffee
bean markets, buying agents still acquire the largest share of the market supply. Local traders are also
those who try to play the buying agents’ game to gain benefit through price margins, especially during
the harvest season.
At harvest time, a small quantity of red cherries goes to wet processing by selling directly to
processors/exporters or indirectly through local traders. Coffee processed by wet method (called wet
processed or washed coffee) only accounted for approximately 15.3% in 2015. According to Dak Lak
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DARD, there are 16 enterprises owning wet processing technology and 23 processing enterprises owning
dry processing technology. The wet processing capacity of the whole province is 64,000 tons/year while
the dry processing capacity is 475,000 tons/year. Although further processing steps take place whereby
the coffee beans are cleaned, sorted, polished, and graded, coffee beans are exported to 53 different
world markets including: Germany (43,468 million USD), Japan (53,090 million USD), Switzerland
(43,468 million USD), Italy (42,228 million USD), etc.
4.2. Descriptive Statistics
According to the descriptive statistics shown in Table 2 the results revealed that surveyed coffee
farmers in CMG and KRP mostly are male (122 of 183). Similar to other agricultural sectors, male
farmers often play an important role in the decision making of the household. These farmers have
considerable experience in coffee farming (more than 8 years), and some farmers even have 15 years
of participating in this sector. The age of coffee farmers ranges from 20 to 67, and the average
age is 44.6 years. The average years of educational level are 9.66 meaning most farmers attained
their education at high school level. Household size was approximately five persons on average.
In some cases, household size was eight persons. Coffee farmers probably may utilize members of
the household as family labor for some operations relating to the production and marketing of coffee.
BMTCA reported that hired labor is costly and extremely hard to find in harvest season. Furthermore,
the average farm size was 1.4 hectares and the maximum farm size was 4 hectares. The fact is that
most coffee plantations in Dak Lak are small-scale operations (<2 hectares) that do not allow farmers
to benefit from economies of scale as well as expand areas and apply synchronous technologies. The
average productivity was 3.2 tons/hectare and the maximum productivity was 5.4 tons/hectare. A total
139 respondents are Kinh ethnic, the rest are Ede, Gia rai, Tay, etc. Surveyed farmers have different
kinds of sustainable coffee production certifications such as 4C, Fairtrade, RFA (Rainforest Alliance),
and UTZ Certified. The number of respondents for each kind of certification are 13 (7.1%), 60 (32.8%),
34 (18.6%) and 76 (41.5%) respectively (Table 3).
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs
Age 44.60109 10.03452 20 67 183
Education 9.661202 2.452846 5 16 183
Experience 8.743169 4.177996 2 15 183
Household size 4.699454 1.187087 2 8 183
Farm size 1.401661 0.6462252 0.3 4 183
Productivity 3215.765 805.0977 1200 5400 183
Table 3. Descriptive statistics.
Variable CMG KRP Total Chi-square
Gender Female 18 (9.8) 43 (23.5) 61 (33.3) 12.652 a
Male 70 (38.3) 52 (28.4) 122 (66.7)
Ethnicity Kinh 76 (41.5) 63 (34.5) 139 (76.0) 10.054 b
Others 12 (6.6) 32 (17.4) 44 (24.0)
Certificate 4C 13 (7.1) 0 (0.0) 13 (7.1) 130.991 c
UTZ 0 (0.0) 76 (41.5) 76 (41.5)
RFA 34 (18.6) 0 (0.0) 34 (18.6)
Fair trade 41 (22.4) 19 (10.4) 60 (32.8)
Note: a,b,c indicates zero cells (0.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 29.33, 21.16,
and 6.25 respectively. Figures within the parenthesis are percentages. 4.3. Transaction Cost Attributes.
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Descriptive statistics results also show that SCP farmers sell their coffee beans to
processors/exporters, buying agents, and local traders with the respective sale proportions of 0.27,
0.54, and 0.17. Results of a pairwise comparison show that the farmers’ average proportion of coffee
sold to buying agents (PCSA) is significantly higher than farmers’ average proportion of coffee sold
to processors/exporters (PCSE) and local traders (PCST). The t values from a pairwise comparison
between PCSE and PCSA, PCSE and PCST, PCSA and PCST are −12.778, 4.843, and 14.610 respectively.
When comparing the farmer’s proportion of coffee sold to different markets between regions (CMG
and KRP), the test statistics however show insignificant differences of PCSE, PCSA, and PCST. The
mean values of PCSE, PCSA, and PCST in CMG and KRP are 0.26 and 0.28 (independent sample t-test
with t = −1.423), 0.54 and 0.56 (independent sample t-test with t = −0.268), 0.20 and 0.16 (independent
sample t-test with t = 1.445) respectively (Appendix A). From this point, regional factors might not
have a significant impact on SCP farmers’ preference prior to different buyers in provincial coffee
market. However, as distinct market competitiveness and local infrastructure conditions in each
production area, the inclusion of the regional factor in the SUR model for further analysis might give
opposite outcomes.
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of different transaction cost attributes of sustainable coffee
farmer in each market. In terms of price uncertainty (UCER), only 35.6% and 37.2% of the surveyed
farmers are confident about the price prior to selling their coffee to processors/exporters and local
traders respectively. Indeed, this value is much higher in the market of buying agents (76%). This is
because the farmers are able to access the daily export price information from the processors/exporters
through buying agents. Sustainable certified coffee farmers in KRP are slightly more confident about
the price than those in CMG when they sell their coffee to processors/exporters (21.9% vs. 13.7%) and
buying agents (39.9% vs. 36.1%). The story is opposite in case of selling to the local traders market
(16.4% vs. 20.8%). Although the coffee farmers seemed confident about the price, only a relatively
small number of farmers reported that they have access to market information (INFO) prior to selling
at each market. About 21.9%, 69%, and 37.2% of the respondents have access to market information
when they sell coffees to processors/exporters, buying agents, and local traders respectively. Still,
buying agents are able to provide more market information to coffee farmers than other actors in the
coffee supply chain.
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of variables influencing market preference.
Variable
Processor/Exporter Buying Agent Local Trader
CMG KRP Chi-Square CMG KRP Chi-Square CMG KRP Chi-Square
UCER 25.00(0.137)
40.00
(0.219) 3.742 *
66.00
(0.361)
73.00
(0.399) 0.085
38.00
(0.208)
30.00
(0.164) 2.634
INFO 26.00(0.142)
14.00
(0.077) 5.865 **
57.00
(0.311)
70.00
(0.383) 1.708
36.00
(0.197)
32.00
(0.175) 1.021
COM 0.00(0.000)
21.00
(0.115) 21.97 ***
50.00
(0.273)
60.00
(0.328) 0.766
70.00
(0.383)
76.00
(0.415) 0.006
PORT 63.00(0.344)
84.00
(0.459) 8.189 ***
45.00
(0.246)
95.00
(0.519) 60.68 ***
50.00
(0.273)
61.00
(0.333) 1.046
GRAD 32.00(0.175)
51.00
(0.279) 5.530 **
25.00
(0.137)
41.00
(0.224) 4.310 **
24.00
(0.131)
38.00
(0.208) 3.303 *
PAY 58.00(0.317)
41.00
(0.224) 9.523 ***
68.00
(0.372)
81.00
(0.443) 1.928
60.00
(0.328)
59.00
(0.322) 0.742
DELI 44.00(0.240)
53.00
(0.290) 0.615
26.00
(0.142)
23.00
(0.126) 0.663
15.00
(0.082)
33.00
(0.180) 7.389 ***
QUAN 50.00(0.273)
53.00
(0.290) 0.020
23.00
(0.126)
21.00
(0.115) 0.406
24.00
(0.131)
19.00
(0.104) 1.344
TRUS 67.00(0.366)
80.00
(0.437) 1.885
19.00
(0.104)
47.00
(0.257) 15.40 ***
37.00
(0.202)
30.00
(0.164) 2.156
Note: *, **, and *** indicates statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively. Figures within the
parenthesis are percentages.
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As mentioned previously, the provincial coffee market is either dominated by private or state-own
processors/exporters. In KRP, Thangloi and Phuocan (state-owned company) are sharing the market.
In CMG, Dakman and Amazaro (foreign-invested company) have long been the largest players.
In fact, none of the surveyed farmers in CMG agreed that the market of processors/exporters is highly
competitive. However, about 11.5% of the respondents in KRP agreed that competition exists between
two state-owned companies, Thangloi and Phuocan. Indeed, the markets of buying agents and
local traders are more competitive as many of these chain actors are scattered throughout the coffee
production areas. A total of 60.1% and 79.8% of the respondents claimed that markets of buying agents
and local traders are highly competitive.
Out of the total of the surveyed farmers, nearly 80.3%, 76.5, and 60.6% need to ship their coffee
prior to selling to processors/exporters, buying agents, and local traders respectively. The number
of KRP coffee farmers that had to bear the expense of transportation (PORT) is significantly higher
than CMG. This is because most of coffee collection and trading activities in KRP take place adjacent
to the Interstate 14 where Thangloi and Phuocan companies are based and the road conditions are
much worse than CMG. At the procurement point, the percentages 45.5%, 36.1%, and 33.9% of the
surveyed farmers need to go through grading procedure (GRAD) before finalizing the transactions
with processors/exporters, buying agents, and local traders. The grading requirements from the
processors/exporters are highly stringent, as coffee beans are sorted by size as well as the classification
of ripe cherries. The comparison of GRAD variables in each market and the average PCSE, PCSA,
and PCST also reveals that grading requirements might hinder farmers from entering the market.
Many more coffee farmers in KRP have to go through grading requirements compared to CMG at
each market.
Dak Lak coffee farmers receive cash in the market exchange with local traders or
processors/exporters. Prior to selling to buying agents, farmers consign (or deposit) their coffee
beans and receive payment in cash later or in exchange of inputs for the next crop year. In some worse
scenarios, the consignment is immediately used to pay for the previous loans. Delayed payment in most
markets is often a case. About 45.9%, 18.5%, and 35% of the respondents have experienced delayed
payment prior to selling coffee to processors/exporters, buying agents, and local traders respectively.
In the case of processor/exporter markets, the number of surveyed farmers who receive late payment
in CMG (16.4%) is significantly smaller than KRP (29.5%). However, the story is somewhat different at
the market of buying agents (10.9% vs. 7.6%).
Through informal contracts with processors/exporters, the delivery of sustainable certified coffee
is arranged before the harvest. The fact is that only 53% of the respondents report that the delivery
was scheduled (DELI) with the processors/exporters. The statistics are 26.6% and 26.2% in case of
selling to buying agents and local traders. Agreement on quantity (QUAN) is not always fixed between
sustainable certified coffee farmers and buyers. This variable was reported at 56.3%, 24.1%, and 23.5%
prior to selling to processors/exporters, buying agents, and local traders respectively. In rural areas,
the trust factor is not simply in terms of a verbal or written contract, but also built over time with
desired economic attributes such as consistency, trustworthiness, dependability, and reliability. Farmers
establish long-term client relationships based on the economic merits of the traders [38]. In this case,
the social relationships are embedded in economic transaction. However, there are many incidents in
Dak Lak where buying agents’ bankruptcy has ruined their strong bond with coffee farmers, even
though many buying agents and local traders are villagers. Not surprisingly, only 36.1% and 36.6% of
the surveyed farmers have trust in buying agents and local traders, while this number in the case of
selling to processor/exporters is much higher (80.3%). Our in-depth interviews confirm that written
commitment is more reliable and convincible than verbal commitment, especially when coffee farmers
move from subsistence farming to commercial farming.
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4.3. Estimation of SUR Model
In this section, the SUR model was used to analyze the factors influencing the farmers’ preferences
over the different markets for sustainable certified coffee. The proportion of coffee sold to each
market (PCSE, PCSA, and PCST) was regressed on a farmer’s socio-economics characteristics and
different transaction cost attributes to identify reasons underlying the market choice. The test statistic
of Breusch–Pagan (test of independence) was 71.171 (Table A4 Appendix A). Hence, the equations
are stochastically related through the disturbances that are serially correlated across equations.
This indicates the system is referred to as SUR model.
Parameter estimates found in Table 5 provide additional insights about the determinants of
farmers’ choice of market. The probability of farmers’ participation in processor/exporter market
was significantly influenced by speed of payment (PAY), fixed procurement quantity (QUAN), age of
farmer household (AGE), education level (EDU), ethnic of farmer household (ETHN), and farm size
(FARM). Speed of payment (PAY) is positively correlated with the probability of farmers’ preference
for the market of processors/exporters at 10% level of significance. QUAN (negotiation cost) appears
to be a more important determinant than other transaction cost attributes that influences coffee
farmers’ decision prior to selling to processors/exporters. This variable is positively correlated
with the probability of farmers’ preference for processor/exporter market at 5% level of significance.
Socio-economic characteristic such as age (AGE), education level (EDU), farm size (FARM) have
a negative influence on the farmers’ preference for processor/exporter market at respectively 0.10,
0.05, and 0.01 level of significance. Therefore, coffee farmers with older age, higher education, and
larger farm size do not intend to increase their proportion of coffee sold to processor/exporter market
outlets. Variable Ethnic (ETHN) has a significantly positive influence on the farmer’s preference for
processor/exporter market at 0.01 level. Thus, Kinh ethnic coffee farmers prefer to sell their coffee
beans to processor/exporter market.
Table 5. Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) parameter estimates for the farmers’ market preference.
Variable
Processor/Exporter Buying Agent Local Trader
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Constant 0.501 *** 0.073 0.439 *** 0.077 0.066 0.071
UCER −0.004 0.018 0.050 ** 0.025 0.116 *** 0.022
INFO −0.004 0.021 0.035 0.023 −0.030 0.021
COM 0.021 0.031 0.044 ** 0.017 −0.019 0.020
PORT −0.030 0.026 −0.097 *** 0.025 −0.021 0.017
GRAD 0.005 0.018 −0.002 0.017 −0.012 0.018
PAY 0.035 * 0.018 0.005 0.021 −0.003 0.017
DELI 0.001 0.021 −0.001 0.020 −0.015 0.019
QUAN 0.037 ** 0.017 0.092 *** 0.020 0.074 *** 0.020
TRUS −0.002 0.023 −0.011 0.018 0.039 ** 0.018
AGE −0.002 * 0.001 0.002 * 0.001 0.001 0.001
GEN −0.017 0.022 0.037 0.024 −0.016 0.023
EDU −0.009 ** 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.006 0.004
ETHN 0.096 *** 0.031 −0.073 ** 0.034 −0.046 0.032
EXPE 0.000 0.004 −0.002 0.004 −0.001 0.004
FARM −0.075 *** 0.016 0.036 ** 0.016 0.036 ** 0.016
LOC −0.036 0.031 −0.071 0.034 0.012 0.031
RMSE 0.127 0.149 0.140
R-sq 0.247 0.393 0.392
Chi-square 56.88 *** 94.25 *** 95.39 ***
Note: *, **, and *** indicates statistically significant at 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 level respectively.
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The probability of choosing buying agent market was determined by price uncertainty (UCER),
market competition (COM), transportation cost (PORT), fixed procurement quantity (QUAN), age of
household (AGE), ethnic (ETHN), and farm size (FARM). In this market, information costs (UCER and
COM) are statistically significant determinants of farmers’ preference for the buying agent market.
Coffee farmers with a perception of market competition and being confident about the price are
more likely to increase their proportion of coffee sold to the buying agent. On the other hand, price
uncertainty may hinder a farmer’s participation in the market as it most likely increases search,
screening, and negotiation costs [52,53]. Transportation cost (negotiation cost) is negatively correlated
with farmers’ preference for the buying agent market at 1% level of significance. Higher transportation
cost eventually hinders coffee farmers from increasing their proportion of coffee sold to buying agents.
Besides, variable QUAN (also negotiation cost) has a positive influence on the coffee farmer’s choice of
buying agent market at 1% level of significance. Contrary to the market of processor/exporter, the age
of farmer household (AGE) has positive influence on the farmer’s preference for market of buying
agents. This means farmer with farmers with an older age prefer to increase their sales to buying
agents. Farm size (FARM) also has a positive influence on a farmer’s preference for the market of
buying agents at 5% level of significance. The estimated coefficient of ETHN show that Kinh ethnic
coffee farmers tend to decrease their proportion of coffee sold to buying agents, which also indicates
that the minority farmers favor this market.
The determinants of a farmer’s preference for market of local traders are price uncertainty (UCER),
fixed procurement quantity (QUAN), trust on buyers (TRUS), and farm size (FARM). This suggests
that coffee farmers who have guaranteed quantity of sale and trust on local traders, are confident about
the price, and own a large farm size are more likely to increase their proportion of coffee sold to local
traders. The positive influence of UCER, QUAN, TRUS, and FARM variables on farmer’s preference
for market of local traders are statistically significant at 1%, 1%, 5%, and 5% respectively. In general,
variables such as market information (INFO), grading (GRAD), payment (PAY), delivery frequency
(DELI), gender (GEN), and farming experience (EXPE), and location (LOC) do not have significant
impact on the market preference of smallholder coffee farmers.
5. Discussion
In this study, farmers used three identified sales channel and preferred to sell the largest proportion
of their coffee beans to the market of buying agents. Over the past few years, coffee farmers established
a strong bond with buying agents based on their credit-bound relationship that somehow fulfills the
desired economic attributes [54]. This, in particular, explains the crucial role of buying agents and
their existing monopolistic power in the supply chain [51]. Yet, the sector has recently restructured.
As a response to the industrialization process, coffee processors/exporters (stated-owned and FDI
private companies) are now making efforts to engage farmer growers into coordinating production
and marketing. Participating farmers can either cultivate in their lands or stated-owned farms, carry
out production under direct supervision or through cooperatives, commit total sale agreement or
proportional coffee volume on designated planting area, and follow technical guidance and support.
This institutional arrangement has paved a shortcut to the end market of raw coffee beans in the
province. However, rigorous requirements in production and product standardization do not often
translate into price premiums, which leads to farmers’ noncompliance or retreat from coordination.
In this situation, farmers prefer to sell their harvest elsewhere due to market price fluctuation, his (or
her) opportunistic behaviors and traditional farming habits. Indeed, this is not completely ruling out
the power of buying agents in the local market, but it is already turning them into competitive actors
in the supply chain. The statistics of coffee sale proportion in this study provides empirical evidence
that greater coordination in the coffee supply chain leads to better market access for farmers.
Like most market participants, coffee farmers decide whether to sell their products in different
markets based on several transaction cost attributes including price uncertainty, a farmer’s perception of
market competition, local infrastructure conditions and distance to the market, local monopoly power,
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market information, product standardization and supervision [8]. Surprisingly, price uncertainty
(UCER) significantly influences farmers’ preference for the market of buying agents and local traders.
Farmers appear to be more confident about the price they will receive at these markets, but are not quite
convinced about the price given by processors/exporters. This implies that the higher the probability
of being uncertain, then the lower the farmer’s preference for the market [9,52,53]. The irony is that
the daily price information circulated in local markets is actually provided by processors/exporters.
So, due to the imperfect knowledge of market participants, uncertainty can be represented by high
transaction cost as the farmer has to face costs to obtain information, to screen, and to negotiate [52,53].
SUR results also showed that a higher level of market competition significantly influences a farmer’s
preference for the market of buying agents. Local poor infrastructure conditions and distances to the
procurement point of processors/exporters increase transportation cost, making them even higher than
the margin farmers receive as if they sell their coffee beans to market of processors/exporters. In this
regard, it helps explaining the positive influence of market competition and negative influence of
transportation cost (PORT) on farmers’ preference for the market of buying agents. The results are in
line with Jari and Fraser [55] who claimed that poor infrastructure has led to inefficient use of different
markets. Negotiation cost, the cost of arriving at an agreement to undertake the transaction [56],
variable QUAN (guaranteed quantity of sale) significantly influence the farmers’ preference for most
markets. The SUR estimate results showed the great positive impact of this transaction cost attribute
on farmer’s preference for three markets. The more the coffee farmer is certain about the sale volume,
the more likely it is that he/she would enter the market. Consistent with the findings of Chitika [57],
on-time payment (PAY) positively influences the farmer’s decision to enter the market, as coffee
production is their main source of their income. The last transaction cost attribute in the SUR model
that significantly affects the farmers’ decision to enter the market of local traders is TRUS (trust).
In Viet Nam, the local traders are commonly embedded in social relationships with coffee farmers.
Hence, economic transactions are embedded in personal relationships, as long as the reciprocal benefit
is sustained [38].
Significant farmers’ demographic and socioeconomic variables in SUR model that influence
transaction costs, and thus farmer’s market preference, include age, farming experience, farm size,
ethnic, location, and certificate ownership. Aged and well-educated farmers can make information and
search costs relatively cheaper [10], thereby encouraging farmers to enter or retreat from the market.
Farmers located in high-potential production areas may experience lower levels of transaction costs
than those in low-potential production areas [9]. This also indicates the impact of the ethnicity variable
on a farmer’s preference to participate in the market, which was mentioned in the study of Tadesse
and Shively [54]. Transactions in the local markets are personalized and influenced by family lineage,
acquaintance, kinship, ethnic, and patron-client relationships. Also, a farmer’s market preference
is assumed to be proportionally related to farm size as farmers with larger farm sized face higher
negotiation costs or otherwise [9]. Certification ownership represents quality of coffee, which is a
function of all pre- and post-harvest activities [58], may include monitoring and enforcement costs [27].
Certificate ownership can also be understood as information and negotiation cost, thus facilitating the
speed of the transaction. However, this factor was omitted from the SUR estimation due to severe
multicollinearity problems. In brief, transaction costs are either observable or non-observable [28].
Inclusion of both is important to determine a farmer’s market preference.
6. Conclusions
There have been an increasing number of farmers participating in sustainable certified coffee
production of Dak Lak. The benefits of standardization have been realized in terms of production
efficiency, environmental protection, biodiversity preservation, and social equity. The belief is that
these desirable impacts were also stemmed from the industrialization process and market reform in
the coffee sector. However, many smallholder farmers at this moment still work their way to struggle
with the main source of income from coffee production. Yet, among the main issues, the biggest
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problem of the coffee market is the market itself. With the transaction cost approach, this study used
the classification scheme by Hobbs [27] to identify several transaction cost components that influence
farmers’ sale decisions in different markets. Empirical results highlight the significant role of several
socio-demographic factors on the market preference of a coffee farmer. The former explanation could
be instable coffee price and ineffective institutional structure in the local market. Farmers normally
expect coffee prices at a level that covers the cost of production and creates reasonable profit. However,
bounded rationality and opportunism behavior redirect their decisions toward an imperfect market.
Besides, economic problems such as imperfect knowledge, ambiguity, and distortion of information
could lead to uncertainty in choosing the right buyers. In addition, the unavoidable cash-shortage and
limited access to loans in rural areas narrow their choices of buyer, and hence constrains small-scale
farmers in the credit-bound relationship with buying agents. Despite the decreasing monopolistic
power, buying agents are still key players in the local coffee supply chain. Repeated transactions
between coffee farmers and buying agents are most often embedded in social relationships (family
lineage, kinship, acquaintance, etc.) where the trust factor anchors their long-term commitment. Given
the alternative formal institution, as processors/exporters have made efforts to engage smallholder
farmers in coordinating production and marketing, a few have been able to gain access to a better
market. However, while this new governance structure has earned initial successes, is has also resulted
in numerous failures. Noncompliance, marginalization, over-dependence, disrupt power relation, and
exploitation are typical examples. In this regard, the vertical integration, on one the hand, progressively
bring farmers in high-potential areas closer to high-value markets, but simultaneously on the other
hand, excludes farmers in low-potential areas from the sector. In brief, farmers are key contributors to
the sustainable development of the Vietnamese coffee sector but also are the most vulnerable ones. Buy
exploring the farmer’ market preference through transaction cost attributes and socio-demographic
factors, this study has provided empirical evidence that social mobility and norms should be carefully
taken into account in coffee market transformation. The markets of exporter/processor were expected
to bring a shortcut to economic well-being of smallholder coffee farmers by offering risk-sharing
opportunities, technological advantages in production, transparency of market information, and
price premiums. However, problems of inconsistency, mutual trust, and thin institutional structure
associated with production constraints of coffee farmers have ruined their shared belief. Therefore,
market imperfection continues to triumph the monopolistic power of buying agents and opportunism
of local traders.
The study is not extrapolated to the entire coffee sector due to results being obtained from a
small research sample. Certified coffee production only accounts for 48.2% of the total coffee output
in Dak Lak. The chosen research areas are adjacent to Buon Me Thuot City where most of coffee
trading activities take place. For that reason, a study at a larger scale could complement this study. In
addition, the inclusion of personalized transaction attributes in the analysis could be another direction
for further research.
Author Contributions: W.B. is the initiator of this PhD research. He provided instructions for the research
design and approach. N.H.A. collected data through surveys in Vietnam, developed and improved the paper,
and provided responses for the journal’s reviewers and editorial board. All the authors read and approved the
final manuscript.
Funding: The authors are grateful to Vietnam International Education Development for funding of this research.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.
Sustainability 2019, 11, 2897 17 of 20
Appendix A
Table A1. Descriptive statistics.
District N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
PCSE
CMG 88 0.25793038 0.16095402 0.01715776
KRP 95 0.28875435 0.13145864 0.01348737
PCSA
CMG 88 0.54385117 0.21984888 0.02343597
KRP 95 0.55147926 0.16253306 0.01667554
PCST
CMG 88 0.19821844 0.19576541 0.02086866
KRP 95 0.15976639 0.16381120 0.01680667
Table A2. Independent samples test.
Variable Levene’s Test t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig t df Sig.(2-tailed)
Mean
Difference
Std. Error
Difference
PCSE
Equal variances
assumed 0.458 0.500 −1.423 181 0.156 −0.030824 0.021657
Equal variances
not assumed −1.412 168.27 0.160 −0.030824 0.021824
PCSA
Equal variances
assumed 3.785 0.053 −0.268 181.00 0.789 −0.007628 0.028441
Equal variances
not assumed −0.265 159.54 0.791 −0.007628 0.028763
PCST
Equal variances
assumed 0.201 0.655 1.445 181.00 0.150 0.038452 0.026614
Equal variances
not assumed 1.435 170.19 0.153 0.038452 0.026795
Table A3. Collinearity Diagnostics.
Variables
PCSE PCSA PCST
Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF
UCER 0.889 1.124 0.583 1.716 0.544 1.839
INFO 0.885 1.130 0.591 1.691 0.593 1.686
COM 0.721 1.387 0.868 1.152 0.956 1.046
PORT 0.645 1.551 0.571 1.753 0.927 1.079
GRAD 0.855 1.170 0.903 1.108 0.902 1.109
PAY 0.837 1.195 0.930 1.076 0.911 1.098
DELI 0.638 1.567 0.834 1.199 0.892 1.121
QUAN 0.934 1.071 0.870 1.150 0.904 1.106
TRUS 0.850 1.177 0.857 1.167 0.862 1.160
AGE 0.673 1.487 0.685 1.459 0.685 1.460
GEN 0.782 1.279 0.781 1.280 0.821 1.218
EDU 0.806 1.241 0.858 1.166 0.836 1.196
ETHN 0.499 2.004 0.500 2.000 0.495 2.022
EXPE 0.395 2.534 0.377 2.649 0.404 2.474
FARM 0.815 1.228 0.915 1.093 0.914 1.094
LOC 0.364 2.744 0.347 2.880 0.390 2.563
Note: Eigen values for PCSE, PCSA and PCST model are 11.645, 11.080, and 10.879 respectively.
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Table A4. Correlation matrix of residuals.
Variable PCSE PCSA PCST
PCSE 1
PCSA −0.3031 1
PCST −0.1583 −0.5215 1
Breusch–Pagan test of independence: chi 2(3) = 71.171, Pr = 0.0000.
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